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Spanish emissions of carbon dioxide have grown by more than 40% 
in 2004 with respect to 1990. This is not compatible with the EU 
allocation of Kyoto-mandated CO2 reduction, even taking into 
account that Spanish emissions are allowed to rise by 15% in 2010. 
The reasons for this situation stem from a combination of economic 
growth and an inefficient energy domain, coupled with a total 
absence of climate change policies. In this paper, we use a static 
general equilibrium model to assess the effects of a sudden and 
intense (ie, with a limited time to carry out significant abatement) 
CO2 reduction by the Spanish economy. Our results show that the 
costs of immediate and medium-size reductions are not significant 
in the short run and could lead to the attaining of the EU agreed 
emissions level for Spain. However, delaying such action means 
that the degree of Spanish CO2 emission reduction is much higher 
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The phenomenon of climate change, with a growing scientific consensus regarding 
causalities and associated damage, forms one of the most serious threats that 
humanity is facing in the next decades. The growing concentration of greenhouse-
effect gases in the atmosphere is expected to provoke very significant physical and 
economic effects throughout the planet (elevations in sea levels, massive 
precipitation, serious droughts, etc.). In particular, carbon dioxide (CO2) is the 
main cause of global warming, representing around 80% of total greenhouse gas 
precursors.  
 
The seriousness of the problem has propelled an important process of international 
agreement in the last few years for the control of these emissions, mainly through 
the Kyoto Protocol. This establishes the commitment of developed countries to 
reduce their greenhouse effect gases an average of 5% with respect to the 1990 year 
of reference. The refusal of the United States to ratify the Kyoto Protocol has 
generated serious doubts regarding its implementation, although the European 
Union (EU) has taken on the role of international leader in the promotion of 
diverse initiatives aimed at its fulfilment. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol was accepted by the European Commission in April 2002, 
laying down a distribution system of emission  reduction efforts among the member 
countries in order to reach the objective of 8% for the entire EU. Among the 
measures adopted by the EU for the fulfilment of the Protocol, there is a Directive 
establishing a scheme for carbon dioxide emission allowance trading within the 
Community. The sphere of application to the market is limited, so only certain 
sectors will be regulated by this measure (electric generation, refinement of 
petroleum, the industries of iron and steel, cement, lime, glass, ceramics, brick and 
tile, paper and paper pulp).  
 
In the year 2004, EU member countries must design a national plan for the 
allocation of rights among the different sectors so that the market may go into 
operation in the year 2005. Within the basic principles of national allocation plans, 
the necessity for additional measures is also established to assure monitoring of   3
sectors not included in the market, since they generate more than 50% of the CO2 
emissions. Such measures are oriented toward policies of energy saving and energy 
efficiency, although this does not rule out the use of environmental taxes.  
  
With respect to the situation in Spain, the distribution of emissions was beneficial 
in permitting Spain to increase its emissions up to a maximum of 15% in the period 
of 2008-2012. However, the economic growth of recent years, together with the lack 
of political initiatives, has led Spain through a path of strong growth in the 
consumption of energy. At the end of 2002, Spain’s emissions of greenhouse gases 
had grown approximately 40%, an unsustainable performance from any point of 
view, be it political, economic or environmental. This figure represents almost 25 
percentage points of excess over the maximum limit allocated for Spain by the EU.  
 
In this context, corrective and intense public policies are to be expected in the short 
term, and thus an insight into their effects seems particularly necessary. This is 
also necessary because Spain, given its geographical situation, is probably one of 
the EU countries to suffer climate change with more intensity. Thus, we analyse 
the effects of attaining different environmental objectives: from a reduction of 2% 
in the emissions of CO2 (the annual reduction necessary in order to fulfil the Kyoto 
Protocol) up to a maximum of 16% (the overall objective for the 2008-2012 period).  
 
The results obtained show that the short term cost of reducing Spanish emissions 
of greenhouse gases, at the annual rate of 2%, has little effect in terms of 
employment as well as in economic activity. However, a reduction of 16% in the 
short term would have a relatively considerable cost. We should conclude, 
therefore, that the inhibition in Spanish policy in facing the Kyoto Protocol during 
recent years will increase the readjustment costs for the Spanish economy. Further 
delays to put into practice the policy instruments for controling Spanish emissions 
will mean major sacrifices in the future. 
 
This article is structured into four sections, including this introduction. In section 
2, the methodological approach is characterized, with a description of the 
theoretical model and the empirical implementation. Section 3 presents the policies 
considered and the results obtained from those simulations. Finally, section 4 
includes the main conclusions of the article and some policy implications.    4
 
2. The computable general equilibrium model 
 
The methodology utilized is a static applied general equilibrium model. The 
breakdown of the energetic sectors in the model, and the environmental model, 
permit us to analyse both the effects on efficiency and on the environment. We 
likewise to include the conclusions of different papers as Dean and Hoeller (1992), 
Clark, Boero and Winters (1996), Repetto and Austin (1997), Hawellek, Kemfert 
and Kremers (2004). They highlight the importance of breaking down the energy 
assets in the economy so as not to produce biased estimation of the costs of 
environmental policies. Our treatment of energy assets and emissions follows a 
methodology similar to that used in other models such as GTAP-E (Rutherford and 
Paltsev, 2000) or MGS-6 for Norway (Faehn and Holmoy, 2003).  
 
Our analysis of the effects of fulfilling the Kyoto Protocol in Spain is especially 
relevant owing to the scarce empirical evidence available. There only exist two 
works that are applied specifically to Spain that analyse the effects of different 
policies against climate change, using a static general equilibrium model. Manresa 
and Sancho (2004) study the possible existence of double dividends of “green” fiscal 
reform in Spain. Unfortunately, the approach used is not satisfactory because of 
the lack of substitution possibilities between energy goods and value added in the 
production function. Moreover they are incapable of simulating the CO2 emissions 
produced by the consumption of fossil fuels, and the volume of emissions are a 
function of the level of production in each sector. Therefore, the policies simulated 
consider homogenous, ad-hoc increases in the indirect taxation on energy assets, 
and are incapable of generating the substitution effects for a real environmental 
tax. There also exists an unpublished work by Gómez and Kverndokk (2002) in 
which the authors also analyse the effects of a “green” fiscal reform in Spain. In 
this case, the authors simulate the CO2  emissions directly associated with the 
consumption of different fossil fuels. Some works applied to the EU also include 
results for Spain, such as those of Carraro, Galeotti and Gallo (1996), Capros et al. 
(1995), Bohringer, Ferris and Rutherford (1997), Barbiker et al (2001), and Barker 
and Köhker (1998). 
 
   5
2.1 Model 
 
To evaluate the efficiency effects of environmental and energy policies, we use a 
multi-sectorial static applied general equilibrium (AGE) model for an open and 
small economy such as Spain. This kind of model allows a greater breakdown of 
institutions and sectors. This is an important feature of the model in order to take 
into account the heterogeneity of energy consumption between sectors. That allows 
us to break down the energy sector as much as possible. Therefore the AGE can 
take into account, to some extent, the different services provided by energies 
(intermediate inputs for production of electricity; lighting, heating and transport 
services for firms and institutions, etc) and differences in CO2 emission factors.  
 
There are 17 productive sectors in the economy and therefore 17 commodities. 
Industries are modelled through a representative firm. They minimize costs 
subjected to null benefits at the equilibrium. Output prices are equal to average 
production costs, as we assume perfect competition and constant returns to scale. 
The production function is a succession of nested constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) functions, as illustrated in Figure 11. The energy goods are taken out from 
the set of intermediate inputs. They are included in a lower nest within the 
production function, allowing for more flexibility and substitution possibilities 
(from dirtier to cleaner energies on the basis of emission factors). Therefore our 
model is similar, although with some changes, to that used by Böhringer, Ferris 











                                                 
1 The appendix contains a detailed description of sectors and elasticities of substitution.    6
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As usual in AGE models2, total production in sector i, measured in units and 
indicated by Bi, is a combination through a Leontief function of intermediate CIDji  
inputs and a composite good made up of capital, labour and different energies, 
KEL3. Where c0 and cij are the technical coefficients measuring the minimum 














       ( 1 )  
 
In a lower nest, capital and labour are combined according to a CES function to 
produce the value added consumed by industries4. In a similar way, electricity, 
coal, gas and refined oil products are combined at different stages of the chained 
structure of the production function to produce the composite energy input as 
ilustrated by Figure 1. Finally, value added and energy are combined with a CES 
function, as in (2). Where α is a scale parameter, σi
KEL is the elasticity of 
substitution and ai is the share of value added (KL) in the nest. 
 
                                                 
2  See Shoven and Whalley (1992). 
3 As a general criterion, the notation used follows the following convention. The endogenous 
variables are written in capital letters. The exogenous variables are written in capital 
letters with a line on top. There are 17 productive sectors (i,j=1, ..., 17) and, consequently, 
17 consumer commodities.  


















     ( 2 )  
 
We follow the Armington approach to model the international trade of goods as 
usual in the literature (Shoven and Whalley, 1992). Imported products are 
imperfect substitutes for national production. Therefore, the total supply of goods 
and services in the economy Ai is a combination of domestic production Bi and 
imports from different origins IMPi with a CES function, as in equation (3). Where 
λi is a scale parameter, σi
A is the elasticity of substitution and b is the share of 



















       (3) 
 
Maximization of benefits by each sector, determined via a constant elasticity of 
transformation (CET) function5, allocates the supply of goods and services between 
the export market EXPi and domestic consumption Di. Where γi is a scale 
parameter,  σi
ε is the elasticity of transformation and di is the share of domestic 
consumption. Since the Spanish economy is small and most commodity trade is 
made with EMU countries, there is no exchange rate (it is fixed) and all agents face 



















      ( 4 )  
 
Capital supply is inelastic (exogenously distributed between institutions), perfectly 
mobile between sectors, but immobile internationally. The model assumes a 
competitive labour market and therefore an economy without involuntary 
unemployment. The labour supply made by households to maximize utility is also 
perfectly mobile between sectors but immobile internationally.  
                                                 
5 See Shoven and Whalley (1992) for a description on how international commerce is 
treated in AGE models.  
6 We assume that the policy simulated has no significative impact on the Euro exchange 
rate as Spain's major business partners are countries which belong to the European 
Monetary Union (EMU).    8
 
Following the breakdown of Spanish national accounts, there are five institutions 
in the economy7: a representative household, a public sector, a foreign sector, non-
profit household-serving institutions (NPHSIs)8 and corporations. In general, they 
receive capital income, carry out net transfers with other institutions and make 
savings in order to balance their budget9. NPISHs consume commodities and 
services determined via a Cobb-Douglas function subject to their budget constraint 
and their savings are proportional to their consumption of goods and 
services. The public sector collects direct taxes (income taxes from households, and 
wage taxes from households and sectors) and indirect taxes (from production and 
consumption). Endowment of capital for the government (KG), transfers with other 
institutions (TRG) and public deficit (DP) are exogenous variables. The 
consumption of goods and services (DiG) by the government is determined by a 
Cobb-Douglas function, where PDi stands for domestic prices. Therefore, total 
public expenditure, capital income (where r is the price for capital services) and tax 






DP r K TR REV PD D
=
=⋅ + + − ⋅ ∑       ( 5 )  
 
The representative household has a fixed endowment of time (TIME) which 
allocates between leisure (LS) and labour. It maximizes utility (W), which is a 
function of leisure (LS) and a composite good (UA) made up by goods and savings, 















      ( 6 )  
 
It is assumed, as in Böhringer and Rutherford (1997), that consumers have a 
constant marginal propensity to save, which is a function of disposable income (YH). 
The latter is equal to the sum of capital income, plus labour income (w  is the 
                                                 
7 These are the institutions in the new European System of Accounts (ESA-95). AGE 
models with a similar set of institutions can be found in Lofgren, Harris and Robinson 
(2001) and Naastepad (2002). 
8 NPISHs consist of non-profit institutions that are not predominantly financed and 
controlled by the government. Some examples of NPISHs are professional associations, 
social clubs, charity organizations, etc. 
9 Capital endowments and transfers are exogenously determined. 
10 σUB is the elasticity of substitution and sUB is the share parameter for leisure on welfare.   9
nominal wage and SCH stands for social contributions, or labour taxes), plus 
transfers (TR), minus income taxes (TH is the tax rate), 
  
() () 11 ( ) HH HH H YT r K w S C T I M E L S T R  =− ⋅ + − ⋅ − +       (7) 
 
Consumption of goods and services is defined by a nested CES function, as shown 
in Figure 2, with special attention being paid to the consumption of energy goods. 
An important contribution of the AGE model is the distinction between energy for 
the house, energy for private transport and other products. Other non-energy goods 
are a composite good formulated via a Cobb-Douglas function. 
 
 













Petrol  for    Energy for the House     Non-Energy Goods 
Private Transport   
 
Electricity   Primary  Energy 
 
 
Coal  Natural Gas  Refined Oil Products      
 
 
The AGE model represents a structural model based on the Walrasian concept of 
equilibrium. Therefore, for each simulated policy, the model must find a set of 
prices and quantities in order to clear up all markets (capital11, labour and 
commodities). Total savings (SAVINGS) in the economy is defined endogenously, 
and is equal to the sum of savings made by each one of the institutions. The 
macroeconomic equilibrium of the model is determined by the exogenous financing 
                                                 
11 There is no quantity adjustment in total supply of capital in the economy, only between 
sectors, because capital endowment is an exogenous variable. The equilibrium condition is 
attained through changes in the price of capital services (r).   10
capacity/need of the economy with the foreign sector (CAPNEC). That is the 
difference between national savings, public deficit and national investment. The 
latter is a composite good made up by a Leontief function regarding the different 
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International prices PXMi, transfers between the foreign sector and other 
institutions and the consumption of goods and services in Spain made by foreigners 
DiRM are exogenous variables. Therefore exports EXPi and imports IMPi have to be 
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The model simulates energy-specific CO2 emissions produced by different sectors 
and institutions. Therefore, we do not simulate the emissions made by some 
industrial production processes such as cement, chemical, etc. They only represent 
about 7% of total Spanish CO2 emissions in 1995 (INE, 2002b). 
 
Emissions are generated during the combustion processes of fossil fuels only. 
Therefore, there is a technological relationship between the consumption of fossil 
fuels in physical units and emissions (θC , θR and θG; for coal, refined oil products 
and natural gas respectively). For example, CO2 emissions from sector i are 
calculated as follows: 
 
2iC i iR i iG i i CO COAL REF GAS θθ θ =⋅ +⋅ +⋅       ( 1 0 )  
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2.2. Data and calibration 
 
The model database is a national accounting matrix for the Spanish economy 
(NAM-95), erected on the basis of the national accounts for 199512, following the 
European System of Accounts (ESA-95). Furthermore, we have extended the 
database with environmental data from different statistical sources (INE, 2002b;  
IEA, 1998) relating consumption of different fossil fuels and emissions for each 
sector and institution. Based on the information obtained from the NAM-95, the 
model's parameters can be gauged by calibration: tax rates or technical coefficients 
for production, consumption and utility functions. The criterion to calibrate the 
model is that the AGE model replicates the information contained in the NAM-95 
as an optimum equilibrium, which will be used as a benchmark13. Certain 
parameters, such as elasticities of substitution, have not been calibrated, but taken 
from pre-existing literature14.  
 
An important parameter in the model like the wage elasticity of the labour supply 
is equal to -0.4, similar to that estimated for Spain by Labeaga and Sanz (2001). In 
order to gauge the elasticity of labour supply, we have followed the procedure used 
in Ballard, Shoven and Whalley (1985) assuming, as in Parry, Williams and 
Goulder (1999), that leisure represents a third of the working hours effectively 
carried out in an initial equilibrium situation. We made a sensitivity analysis, 
increasing and reducing the labour elasticity by 50%. From this analysis we can 
conclude that results from the AGE are robust. 
 
The database contains only monetary values from the national accounts, and 
therefore we can not distinguish between prices and quantities. As usual in this 
literature, we follow the Harberger convention to calibrate the model at the 
benchmark. As a result, all prices for goods and factors and activity levels are set 
equal to one, whereas the amount of consumption and production are set equal to 
the monetary values in the database. Following this convention, we can analyse the 
                                                 
12 It is based on a NAM published by Fernandez and Manrique (2004) and the National 
Accounts (INE, 2002a). For a detailed description of the NAM-95 and the procedure used, 
see Rodríguez (2003). 
13 For a brief introduction to this methodology, see Shoven and Whalley (1992). 
14 Appendix contains a detailed description of subtitution elasticities used in the AGE.   12
effects of simulated policies as relative changes in prices and activity levels with 
respect to the benchmark. The AGE model has been programmed in 
GAMS/MPSGE and we calibrated the model following the procedure in Rutherford 
(1999) by using the solver-algorithm PATH. 
 
 
3. The costs of Kyoto for Spain 
 
3.1. Simulated policies 
 
In 2002, Spanish greenhouse gas emissions had grown approximately 40% with 
respect to emissions from 1990. The rough draft of the national plan for the 
allocation of emission rights, drawn up by the Spanish government in July 2004, 
establishes that between 2008 and 2012, the average amount of emissions should 
not go beyond the emissions made in 1990 by more than 24%. This value is the 
result of the sum of the maximum limit given by the EU for Spain (+15%), the 
estimation of the absorption of drains (-2%) and the credits coming from the foreign 
market (-7%). In the current situation (the best of the scenarios), it would be 
necessary, therefore, to reduce emissions by 16% in order to reach a growth of 
emissions equal to +24% establish by the Spanish government, or equally, to 
reduce Spanish emissions at an annual rate of 2%. 
 
In order to analyse the effects of fulfilling the Kyoto Protocol in Spain, we have 
considered different objectives; from a reduction policy of 2% in Spanish 
greenhouse gas emissions (equivalent to the annual rhythm of reduction necessary) 
to a drastic reduction equal to 16% (the overall objective in the Spanish national 
plan). Thus, we may explore the relationship between the intensity of the 
environmental objectives and its economic and social effects.  
 
The political instrument that we have considered in order to model environmental 
policy is a tax on CO2 emissions, the principal gas causing climate change. The 
fiscal collections generated by the tax will be returned to citizens through lump 
sum transfers, subject to the restriction that public expenditure should remain 
constant in real terms. Therefore the environmental tax (equivalent to for a market 
of emission permits under some theoretical conditions) has the sole intention of   13
reducing pollutant emissions. The reimbursement of the collections through lump 
sum transfers assures us that the only distortions in the efficiency generated by 
the simulated policy will be attributable to the environmental tax, which is to say, 
the environmental objectives. To analyze the effects of different fiscal policies 
through “green” fiscal reforms and the existence or non-existence of double 
dividends (Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002) is therefore outside of the objectives 
proposed in the work. 
 
Moreover, the hybrid regulations are a politically relevant option for the European 
case, as we have already put forward in the introduction. Thus, McKibbin and 
Wilcoxen (1997) and Pizer (1997) defend the use of tradable pollution permits 
assigned for free by the government among the different sectors, together with 
additional permits at a price set beforehand by the government (equivalent to an 
environmental tax). 
 
This is clearly of interest when there exists a great number of small non-mobile 
emitters (e.g. residential homes, small businesses and industries, or agricultural 
operations) or mobile ones (e.g. automobiles and trucks). Their inclusion in the 
emission permit market is not advisable for reasons of the high costs of transaction 
that the polluters would be subject to, or the disproportionate costs of control and 
monitoring on the part of the regulator. However, sectors such as these represent 
more than 50% of the greenhouse gas emissions in developed countries. For 
instance, the transport sector, not subjected to the european emissions permit 
market, currently represents 24% of the total of Spanish emissions of greenhouse 
gases. Its emissions have grown by a 60% between 1990 and 2002. Therefore, there 
exist reasons of efficiency and fairness that cause this and other sectors excluded 





In figure 3, we present the effects of the different simulated policies on the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), employment and social welfare. When the short-term 
environmental objectives pursued by the government are modest, with reductions 
in CO2 emissions of less than 6%, small drops in the GDP of less than 0.5% will be   14
produced. If we increase the reduction of emissions by an amount around 10-12%, 
the effects on GDP are significant, with drops of approximately 1%. Finally, the 
environmental objective proposed by the government for the 2008-2012 period, 
which is to say, a drop in emissions of 16%, could, in the short term, provoke 
significant effects on the economic activity equivalent to a loss of 1.6% of the GDP. 
 
Figure 3. Reduction in Spanish CO2 emissions and its effects on GDP, 
employment and social welfare. These are percentage changes (%) as 












-16 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2
change (%) in CO2 emissions
% GDP % EV % employment
 
  Source: own calculations. EV stands for the hicksian equivalent  
    variation on social welfare. 
 
 
There exists, therefore, a slight convex relationship between the reduction of 
emissions and the costs in terms of GDP. Small reductions in emissions are easily 
reachable, but these become more costly as we toughen the objectives of the 
environmental policy. Previous results highlight the opportunity costs of delaying 
the introduction of instruments for the control of Spanish CO2  emissions. The 
shorter is the period of time to reach a certain environmental objective, the higher 
the cost to the economy. These results are consistent with the empirical evidence 
analyzed by different works, such as those of Grubb et al (1993), Clarke et al (1996) 
or Dean and Hoeller (1992). 
   15
The adverse effects of the environmental policy on the economic activity translate 
into a drop in the demand for labour, as shown in figure 3. The effects on 
employment, estimated through the model, were the results of two opposing 
economic forces. Firstly, the environmental objectives represent an additional cost 
for the different sectors, characterised by the tax rate coming from the 
environmental regulation. Said extraordinary cost would have a negative effect on 
activity and therefore, on the demand for labour. Secondly, the environmental 
regulation encourages the demand of labour. At the firm level there is a 
substitution effect between dirtier and cleaner energies, but also between energy 
and other productive factors such as work. At the macroeconomic level, the 
substitution effects can provoke sectorial changes in the structure of the economy, 
reducing the weight of the sectors that are intensive in energy in favor of labour 
intensive ones. 
 
The equilibrium between both opposite forces makes the drop in the demand for 
labour less intensive than the effects on economic activity. Thus, a drop in CO2 
emissions of less than 6% produces a loss of employment of small significance and 
inferior to 0.3%. It can also be observed that the negative effect on employment 
grows with lesser intensity than it does on the GDP. As a result, reducing the 
Spanish emissions of    CO2 by 16% would produce a contraction in employment of 
0.8%, approximately half the effect on the GDP.  
 
Our results contrast with those obtained by Manresa and Sancho (2004). These 
authors estimate that a reduction of approximately 3.5% in Spanish CO2 emissions 
would cause a 17% increase in the unemployment figures of 1990. The impact on 
the labour market is considerably more negative than that estimated in our work. 
However, both results are difficult to compare, since Manresa and Sancho (2004) 
take into account a curve or function that relates salaries and unemployment 
instead of a competitive labour market. 
 
Surprisingly, the effects of the simulated environmental policies on the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) are similar to the effects on GDP, although they present the 
opposite sign logically. The changes in the estimated prices are relative with 
respect to the numeraire (international prices in our model), and are presented in 
figure 4. Relatively small reductions in pollution emissions (lower than 6%) have   16
effects of little significance on inflation (increases of prices less than 0.5%). In 
extreme cases, a 16% reduction in emissions would cause an increase of 1.5% in 
consumer prices. 
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Source: own calculations. Consumer Price Index with respect to 
the numeraire  (international prices). 
 
 
Unlike the variables studied previously, there exists a strong non-linear 
relationship between the reduction in emissions and its effects on social welfare 
(excluding environmental effects). The changes in social welfare are measured in 
terms of equivalent variations, as it is usual in the literature (Shoven and Whalley, 
1992). Said relationship is convex, as shown in figure 5. This is to say, the negative 
effects on social welfare grow more than proportionally than the changes in CO2 
emissions. In any case, the effects are of little significance. In this way, a reduction 
of 16% in CO2 emissions would have a cost of only 0.1% in terms of social welfare. 
We should not forget that the fiscal revenues obtained by the environmental tax 
are returned to citizens through lump sum transfers which may reduce the impact 
of the public policy on consumption. Manresa and Sancho (2004) also obtain results 
of little significance on welfare when simulating a reduction of approximately 3.5% 
in Spanish CO2 emissions. Similar results also have been obtained by Bohringer, 
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Figure 5. Percentage changes (%) in e CO2  emissions and social welfare 
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  Source:  own calculations. EV stands for the hicksian equivalent  
  v a r i a t i o n   o n  social welfare. 
 
 
The costs for Spain in fulfilling the Kyoto terms could be smaller when political 
action is articulated through “green” fiscal reforms. Using the fiscal income 
collected by the environmental tax in order to reduce other distorted taxes 
(generally, income taxes) generates a weak double dividend (Bovenberg and 
Goulder, 2002), which permits the reduction of the costs of environmental 
regulation. This is shown by diverse empirical works, such as those of Carraro, 
Galeotti and Gallo (1996), Capros et al. (1995) or Gómez and Kverndokk (2002). All 
of these have analysed the effects of a “green” fiscal reform in Spain, with reduction 
in social contribution. In all cases, the effects on GDP were of little significance. 
The previous works also estimate effects of little significance on employment. 
However, Barker and Köhler (1998) estimate that a reduction in Spanish emissions 
of CO2, through a “green” fiscal reform with a reduction in social contributions, 
could increase employment by 1.2%. Contrary to the previous results, Barbiker et 
al. (2001) estimate that the costs of Kyoto for Spain, in terms of social welfare, will 
be significant. 
 
In order to study the sectorial effects of the environmental policy, we have analysed 
a policy of 2% reduction in CO2 emissions, a reasonable short term objective. From 
the simulation of said policy, we can understand the effects on the level of activity 
and the emissions in different sectors of our model, which are shown in figure 6. 
The most significant effects on production arise in primary energy sectors, with   18
drops that oscillate between 2.8% for the coal sector and 2.1% for the refined 
petroleum sector.  
 
Figure 6. Sectorial effects on production and emissions from a 2% 
reduction in CO2. 




















  Source: own calculations. 
 
 
The electric sector, however, experiences a slight drop equal to 0.4%, owing to two 
fundamental reasons. The classical thermal power utilities (coal, fueloil, gas) 
represent only 40% of the total electricity generation in Spain. In other words, only 
40% of production from the electric sector will be indirectly levied by the 
environmental tax. In addition, this causes that electricity is now cheaper in 
relative terms with respect to fossil fuels and that is encouraging the consumption 
of electricity through the substitution  effects.  
 
The remaining non-energy sectors experienced not very significant effects on their 
activity, ranging from a drop of 0.3% in diverse products to a null effect on 
agriculture and fishing, food, hotel and catering businesses and certain services 
(education, health, leisure and culture, etc.). The previous results are reasonable if 
we bear in mind that electricity represents approximately 70% of the final 
consumption of energy in Spain.  
   19
Reduction of emissions is distributed in a less heterogeneous way than the changes 
in the level of activity. In general, all the economic sectors reduce their emissions 
in a significant way and by an amount over 1%. As we expected, the drops in the 
energy sectors, over 3% except in electricity (2.3%), stand out. Other sectors such 
as diverse products (chemical, mineral and metallic products), also achieve 





Spanish emissions of greenhouse gases have followed a path of strong growth 
during recent years. This behaviour is incompatible with the objectives of Kyoto for 
Spain, and in addition, it reflects an inefficiency and a very dependent energy 
system. In accordance with the internal distribution of the EU, in order to fulfil the 
Kyoto Protocol, Spain should reduce it current greenhouse gas emissions 16% in 
the period from 2008 to 2012, therefore having an average annual reduction of 2%. 
 
The objective of this work is to analyse the costs for Spain of fulfilling the 
European Community objectives of reducing emissions through the introduction of 
a tax on CO2  emissions. The methodology employed is a static applied general 
equilibrium model for a small open economy. The consumption of energetic assets 
on the part of industries and institutions has been broken down as much as 
possible from the national accounting data supplied. This characteristic lends the 
model sufficient flexibility so that the agents may substitute, in an efficient 
manner, the consumption of some energy assets for others that are less pollutant. 
In addition, the model simulates the CO2 emissions associated with the 
consumption of fossil fuels. Both characteristics permit the model to minimize the 
costs of the environmental policy. 
 
The results obtained show that the costs of reaching the objects set by the EU for 
Spain are of little significance if the measures of environmental policy are taken 
within a sufficient amount of time in advance. The objective of the government to 
reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases at an annual rate of 2% would result in a 
drop equal to 0.2% in the GDP as a consequence, with this figure being even lower 
in terms of employment. The effects on social welfare would be null.   20
 
The energy sectors are logically the most affected by environmental regulation, 
with drops in activity of close to 2%. The consequences on the electric sector are, 
however, very small, owing to the effects of substitution which favour the 
consumption of this energy. The losses in activity in the remaining non-energy 
sectors are of little significance. 
 
Nevertheless, if the Spanish government persists with a policy of inhibition in the 
short term, of “wait and see”, the consequences for Spain could be very negative. 
Given the limited temporary margin that the politicians have left by the three 
previous governments, an extreme situation could arise of a reduction of 16% in 
emissions in the short term in the best case scenario (if the emissions maintain 
their current level, something that is not probable). In this context, the economic 
and social cost would be significant, with a loss of over 1% in GDP. 
 
Therefore, the conclusions obtained from the available empirical evidence are clear. 
It is especially advisable to introduce, as soon as possible, public measures for the 
control of greenhouse gas emissions. Obviously, these should be introduced through 
cost-effective instruments of environmental policy; for example, through a hybrid 
system of taxes on some sectors and institutions along with an emission commerce 
system for some spacific industrial sectors as the european.    21
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Note for parameters in production and consumption functions. Greek letters stand for scale 
parameters {α, γ, λ, φ}. Elasticitity of substitution is referenced by σ. Latin letters stand for 
the share parameters in the producttion and consumption functions {a, b, c, d, s}. 
 




The preferences of the representative household, with relation to the different commodities 
and services, have been gauged by using the following elasticities of substitution. The 
elasticity of substitution between fuel for private transport, energy for the home and a 
commodity aggregated by the remaining commodities is 0.1. The elasticity of substitution 
between electricity and the remaining energy for the home is 1.5. The elasticity of 
substitution between coal, natural gas and the remaining refined oil products which 
provide energy for the household is 1. The previous elasticities are similar to those used in 
Böhringer and Rutherford (1997), but lower in some cases following the principle of caution. 
Therefore we could say that the results obtained are somewhat conservative.  
 
Table A1 describes the elesticities of substitution in CES production functions: σiKEL is the 
elsticicity between the composite goods value added (KL) and energy; σiKL is the elsticicity 
between capital and labour; σiE  is the elasticity between electricity and the composite good 
primary energies; σiEP is the elsticicity between coal and the composite good hydrocarbon 
fuels; σiPET is the elasticity between natural gas and refined oil products; σiA is the elasticity 
between imported goods and domestic production; σi
ε is the elasticity between exported 




Table A.1. Elasticities of substitution in the different activities. 
 
  σiKEL (3)  σiE (4)  σiKL (1)  σiNE (4)  σiPET (4)  σiA (1)  σi
ε (2) 
AGRIC  0.5 0.3  0.56  0.5 0.5 2.2 3.9 
CRUDE  0.5 0.3  1.26  0.5 0.5 2.8 2.9 
MIN  0.96 0.3 1.26 0.5  0.5  1.9  2.9 
FOOD  0.5 0.3  1.26  0.5 0.5 2.8 2.9 
MANUF  0.8 0.3  1.26  0.5 0.5 2.8 2.9 
CHEM  0.96 0.3 1.26 0.5  0.5  1.9  2.9 
PROMIN  0.96 0.3 1.26 0.5  0.5  1.9  2.9 
METAL  0.88 0.3 1.26 0.5  0.5  2.8  2.9 
CONSTR  0.5 0.3  1.40  0.5 0.5 1.9 0.7 
SERV1  0.5 0.3  1.26  0.5 0.5 1.9 0.7 
HOST  0.5 0.3  1.68  0.5 0.5 1.9 0.7 
TRANSP  0.5 0.3  1.68  0.5 0.5 1.9 0.7 
SERV2  0.5 0.3  1.26  0.5 0.5 1.9 0.7 
COAL  0.5 0.3  1.12  0.5 0.5 2.8 2.9 
OIL  0.5 0.3  1.12  0.5 0.5 2.8 2.9 
ELEC  0.5 0.3  1.26  0.5 0.5 2.8 2.9 
GAS  0.5 0.3  1.12  0.5 0.5 2.8 2.9 
Source: Drawn up by us for this study.  
Notes: (1) GTAP (Hertel, 1997); (2) deMelo and Tarr (1992); (3) Kemfert and Welsch (2000); 







   26
 
 
Table A.2. Sectors in the NAM-1995 and correspondence with the SIOT-1995 
 
Sectors NAM-95  Description  Code SIOT 1995 
AGRI  Agriculture, livestock and game, silviculture, fishing and aquiculture   SIOT 01, 02, 03 
COAL  Extraction and agglomeration of anthracite, coal, lignite and peat  SIOT 04
CRUDE 
Extraction of crude oil and natural gas. Extraction of uranium and 
thorium minerals   SIOT 05
MINER  Extraction of metallic, non-metallic nor energetic minerals    SIOT 06, 07
OIL  Coke, refined oil products and treatment of nuclear fuels   SIOT 08
ELEC Electricity  SIOT 09
GAS Natural  gas  SIOT 10
FOOD  Food and drink  SIOT 12-15
MANUF  Other manufacturing industries  SIOT 11, 16-20, 31-38
CHEM  Chemical industry  SIOT 21-24
PROMIN  Manufacturing of other non-metallic minerals, recycling  SIOT 25-28, 39
METAL  Metallurgy, metallic products   SIOT 29, 30
CONSTR Construction  SIOT 40
SERV1 
Telecommunications, financial services, real estate, rent, computing, 
R+D, professional services, business associations.   SIOT 41-43, 50-58, 71
HOTEL-REST  Hotel and restaurant trade  SIOT 44
TRANSP  Transport services  SIOT 45-49
SERV2 
Education, health, veterinary and social services, sanitation, leisure, 
culture, sports, public administrations  SIOT 59-70
Source: Drawn up by us for this study. The Symmetric Input Output Table (SIOT) codes represent the different 
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